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Powell v. State: The Demise of Georgia's
Consensual Sodomy Statute
In Powell v. State,1 the Supreme Court of Georgia held that section
16-6-2 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A."), 2 which
criminalizes sodomy, violates the right to privacy guaranteed by the
Georgia Constitution.3 The court found that the right to engage in
private, unforced, consensual, noncommercial sexual acts is included
within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Georgia Constitution.4
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Gwinnett County District Attorney, Daniel J. Porter, charged
Anthony San Juan Powell in an indictment with rape and aggravated
sodomy. Powell was accused of having sexual intercourse with and
engaging in cunnilingus with his wife's seventeen-year-old niece without
her consent and against her will. Powell admitted committing these
acts; however, he contended that the sexual acts were consensual.
Because of his testimony admitting the sexual acts, the Gwinnett
Superior Court instructed the jury on the law of sodomy. The jury
acquitted Powell of rape and aggravated sodomy but found him guilty of
sodomy.5
Powell appealed his conviction on two grounds. First, he contended
that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury on the law of
sodomy sua sponte because that allowed the jury to consider sodomy,
which he was not charged with in the indictment. Second, he contended
that the statute criminalizing sodomy committed in private by consent-

1. 270 Ga. 327, 510 S.E.2d 18 (1998).
2. This statute provides, "A person commits the offense of sodomy when he or she
performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the
mouth or anus of another." O.C.G.A. § 16-6-2(a) (1999). Aggravated sodomy is defined as
sodomy committed "with force and against the will of the other person." Id.
3. 270 Ga. at 336, 510 S.E.2d at 26.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 327, 510 S.E.2d at 20.
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ing adults was unconstitutional because it violated his right to privacy
guaranteed by the Georgia Constitution.
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

In 1784 Georgia adopted the common law of England as the law of
Georgia.7 Until 1816 sodomy was a crime only in the common law.'
Georgia's first sodomy statute was codified in the Penal Code of 1816."
In the 1845 Code, the General Assembly defined sodomy as "the carnal
knowledge and connexion against the order of nature by man with man,
or in the same unnatural manner with woman." 10 This statute, with
the exception of the spelling of "connexion," remained in force until
1968.11 This statute produced a plethora of surprising judicial decisions.
Herring v. State2 was the first of many decisions interpreting the
sodomy statute. The supreme court held that "there is no limitation as
to the means by which this crime may be committed." 3 Thus, the court
found that "the abominable crime not fit to be named among Christians"
could be committed either per anum (by means of the anus), per os (by
means of the mouth), or by any similar means. 4 The supreme court
reaffirmed Herring in White v. State.'6 In Jones v. State," the Georgia Court of Appeals reaffirmed Herring and stated that it was
"'unwilling to soil the pages of our reports with lengthened discussion of

6. Id.
7. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 n.5 (1986). After the ecclesiastical
courts merged with the King's Courts, Parliament passed a statute criminalizing sodomy.
See 478 U.S. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring). For a detailed history of the law of sodomy
from biblical times through the middle of the twentieth century, see Barton v. State, 79 Ga.
App. 380, 381-86, 53 S.E.2d 707, 708-11 (1949).
8. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192 n.5.
9. See id. The statute read: "Sodomy and bestiality, shall be punished by imprisonment at hard labour, in the penitentiary, during the natural life or lives of the person or
persons convicted of these detestable crimes." A COMPILATION OF THE LAws OF THE STATE

OF GEORGIA 571 (Lucius Q.C. Lamar ed., Augusta, T. S. Hannon 1821).
10. A CODIFICATION OF THE STATUTE LAW OF GEORGIA, INCLUDING THE ENGLISH
STATUES OF FORCE 709 (William A. Hotchkiss ed., Augusta, Charles E. Greenville 2d ed.

1848).
11. See GA. CODE § 26-5901 (1933) ("Sodomy is the carnal knowledge and connection
against the order of nature, by man with man, or in the same unnatural manner with
woman.").
12. 119 Ga. 709, 46 S.E. 876 (1904).
13. Id. at 721, 46 S.E. at 881.
14. Id., 46 S.E. at 882 (internal quotation marks omitted).
15. 136 Ga. 158, 158, 71 S.E. 135, 135 (1911).
16. 17 Ga. App. 825, 88 S.E. 712 (1916).
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the loathsome subject.'"' 7 The court also extended the definition of
sodomy to include deviate sexual acts, whether or not supported
expressly by the statute (in this case, male to male fellatio)."i These
decisions were unusual because they uncharacteristically read a criminal
statute broadly rather than narrowly. 9
The next case of note concerning the sodomy statute was Comer v.
State.20 Comer involved cunnilingus, which defendant argued was not
encompassed by the sodomy statute. 21 The court of appeals reaffirmed
Herring, White, and Jones and stated that "it follows, as a reasonable,
logical, and unescapable deduction," that the sodomy statute should be
read broadly to include cunnilingus.22 In dissent Judge Bloodworth
stated that the statute, being a criminal statute, must be construed
strictly.'
Though he conceded that sodomy may be committed per
anum or per os, he concluded that the statue required penetration of
"either end of the alimentary canal" by the male's penis. 4 Thus, he
found that cunnilingus was not a crime under the statute and that
sodomy cannot be "committed under our statute without use of the virile
organ of the man."2 5 Judge Bloodworth suggested that the legislature
should amend the statute if it wished cunnilingus to be a crime. 26 The
legislature did not heed Judge Bloodworth's counsel until 1968.
Though the court of appeals did not overrule Comer, it re-evaluated
the position it took in that case in Wharton v. State. 27 Relying on
Texas authority, the court stated that penetration by the male sex organ
was required for a conviction of sodomy.'
The court thus read the
statute narrowly. The effect of the decision was to acknowledge that
Judge Bloodworth's dissent in Comer was a correct assessment, but the
court did not mention Comer in its decision.

17.

Id. at 827, 88 S.E. at 713 (quoting Means v. State, 104 N.W. 815, 815 (Wis. 1905)).

18. Id.
19. See Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438,438-39,499 S.E.2d 630,631-32 (1998) (holding that
criminal statutes must be strictly construed against the state and in favor of the
defendant); Glustom v. State, 206 Ga. 734, 738, 58 S.E.2d 534, 536-37 (1950) (same);
Johnson v. State, 1 Ga. App. 195, 195, 58 S.E. 265, 265 (1907) (same).
20. 21 Ga. App. 306, 94 S.E. 314 (1917).
21. Id. at 307, 94 S.E. at 314.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 306-07,
at 307, 94
at 308-09,
at 309, 94

94 S.E. at 314.
S.E. at 314 (Bloodworth, J., dissenting).
94 S.E. at 315.
S.E. at 315.

27.

58 Ga. App. 439, 198 S.E. 823 (1938).

28. Id. at 439, 198 S.E. at 823 (citing Green v. State, 79 S.W. 304, 304 (Tex. Crim. App.
1904)).
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The next year, in Thompson v. Aldredge,2 9 the supreme court was
faced with a case involving two women who were convicted of cunnilingus.3 The court found that cunnilingus between two women was not
criminalized by the statute: "That the act here alleged to have been
committed is just as loathsome when participated in by two women does
not justify us in reading into the definition of the crime something which
the lawmakers omitted."3 1 The supreme court, following the lead of the
court of appeals in Wharton, narrowly interpreted the statute.3 2 Thus,
the court affirmed that sodomy requires the participation of a man.33
In 1949 the General Assembly revisited the sodomy statute. It
reduced the punishment from life in prison to imprisonment from one to
ten years (for sodomy committed on a person over sixteen years old) but
did not substantively change the definition of the crime.3
In the same year, the court of appeals again addressed the issue of per
anum and per os sodomy in Barton v. State. 5 Defendant was indicted
for "carnal knowledge and connection, against the order of nature, and
in an unlawful manner" with another man.36 Defendant demurred on
the ground that the indictment did not state in what way and manner
defendant had carnal knowledge.3 7 The court upheld the demurrer.'
The court explained that the history of sodomy laws included only acts
committed per anum but that Herringextended that definition to include
acts committed per os; therefore, an indictment must specifically describe
how the defendant committed the crime. 9 In essence the court stated
that sodomy has been judicially extended and that the common law
crime of sodomy did not include acts committed per os.
In 1963 the supreme court overruled Comer. In Riley v. Garrett,'
the court found that a man cannot be punished for a crime that a
woman could not be punished for also. 41 Thus, the court found that
cunnilingus was not a crime under the sodomy statute.42 The court

29.

187 Ga. 467, 200 S.E. 799 (1939).

30. Id. at 467, 200 S.E. at 800.
31. Id.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id.
1949 Ga. Laws 275, 276.
79 Ga. App. 380, 53 S.E.2d 707 (1949).

36. Id. at 381, 53 S.E.2d at 708 (internal quotation marks omitted).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 386-87, 53 S.E.2d at 711.
39.
40.

Id.
219 Ga. 345, 133 S.E.2d 367 (1963).

41. Id. at 346-47, 133 S.E.2d at 369-70.
42. Id. at 347-48, 133 S.E.2d at 370.
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reconciled the seemingly conflicting decisions in Comer and Thompson
by expressly adopting Judge Bloodworth's dissent in Comer and holding
that the statute must be construed strictly and that sodomy requires
penetration by the male sex organ either per anum or per os.4
Following Riley, the General Assembly revised the sodomy statute to
read: "A person commits sodomy when he performs or submits to any
sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus
of another."" The legislature also changed the punishment for sodomy
45
to "imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years."
46
In Carter v. State, the court of appeals again addressed the issue
of penetration in a case involving cunnilingus. The court conceded that
prior cases required penetration by the male sex organ per anum or per
os for a sodomy conviction. 47 However, the court held that the new
statute, by its text and plain meaning, did not require penetration.4
The court stated, "It does not appear that a jury of reasonable intelligence could construe a sexual act 'involving' the mouth of one person and
" 49
the sex organs of another as anything other than actual contact.
Thus, cunnilingus was (again?) illegal in Georgia.
The argument that the sodomy statute violates an individual's right
5
to privacy appears to have been raised first in Stover v. State." In
Stover defendant was in a public place when the act of sodomy ocTherefore, the court held that5 2defendant did not have
curred.5
raise an issue regarding privacy.
to
standing
53
The privacy argument was again raised in Gordon v. State.
Defendant contended that the statute did not "differentiate between the
sex or marital status of the possible offenders and, therefore, applies
5 4
The
equally to homosexual and heterosexual intimate relationships.
the
private
court found that the validity of the statute as applied to
sexual relations of a married heterosexual couple need not be decided

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 347, 133 S.E.2d at 370.
1968 Ga. Laws 1249, 1299.
Id.
122 Ga. App. 21, 176 S.E.2d 238 (1970).
Id. at 23, 176 S.E.2d at 240.
Id. at 22-23, 176 S.E.2d at 240.
Id. at 23, 176 S.E.2d at 240.
256 Ga. 515, 350 S.E.2d 577 (1986).
Id. at 516, 350 S.E.2d at 578.
Id.
257 Ga. 439, 360 S.E.2d 253 (1987).
Id. at 439, 360 S.E.2d at 254.
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because defendant "failed to show that his own conduct could not be
regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity.""5
In Christensen v. State,5" the supreme court finally addressed the
privacy issue involved with the sodomy statute. Defendant was
convicted of solicitation of sodomy."7 Defendant argued that the
essential component of solicitation of sodomy was the crime of sodomy
and that such crime "infringe[d] upon the privacy rights ...

of adult

citizens."56 The court observed that Georgia "has long recognized a
right of privacy inherent in the due process clause of the Georgia
Constitution." 9
The court in Christensen addressed the privacy issue by stating,
"When a privacy interest is implicated, the state must show that the
legislation has a 'reasonable relation to a legitimate state purpose."
The court stated that the police power of the state includes the power to
"enact laws to promote the public health, safety, morals, and welfare of
its citizens."6 ' The court held that the proscription of sodomy is a
legitimate state interest and is in compliance with the police power of
the state as upholding the moral welfare of the public. 2 The court
acknowledged that many states have abandoned their sodomy statutes,
but in Georgia that would be the responsibility of the people via the
legislature."
Justice Sears delivered a seething dissent in Christensen. She stated
that "when the right to privacy is implicated by a state statute,.., the
State is required to produce nothing less than a compelling interest in
that statute in order to override the privacy rights implicated."4
Justice Sears demanded that the constitutional standard of strict
scrutiny or the compelling interest standard must be used in this
case.65 She found that the State's arguments did not meet strict

55. Id. at 439-40, 360 S.E.2d at 254 (internal quotation marks omitted). For examples
of other cases in which the supreme court refused to address the privacy issue, see Phagan
v. State, 268 Ga. 272, 273-74, 486 S.E.2d 876, 879 (1997); King v. State, 265 Ga. 440, 441,
458 S.E.2d 98, 99 (1995); Smashum v. State, 261 Ga. 248, 249, 403 S.E.2d 797, 798 (1991).
56. 266 Ga. 474, 468 S.E.2d 188 (1996).

57. Id. at 474-75, 468 S.E.2d at 189.
58. Id. at 475, 468 S.E.2d at 189.
59. Id. The court also observed that the "Georgia Constitution confer[s] greater rights
and benefits than the federal constitution.' Id.
60. Id. at 476,468 S.E.2d at 190 (quoting Blincoe v. State, 231 Ga. 886,887,204 S.E.2d
597, 598 (1974)).

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 476-77, 468 S.E.2d at 190.
Id. at 482, 468 S.E.2d at 194 (Sears, J., dissenting).
Id.
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scrutiny and that the conviction of Christensen, as well as the statute,
should be overturned as unconstitutional.6 6 Justice Hunstein, while not
completely agreeing with Justice Sears's opinion, also stated that strict
scrutiny should be the standard to determine whether a statute violates
a person's right to privacy, not the rational basis, or low scrutiny, test
used by the majority.6 7
Powell v. State was the next case in which the supreme court
addressed sodomy and its relation to the right to privacy guaranteed by
the state constitution. In Powell the majority agreed with Justices Sears
and Hunstein that strict scrutiny should be applied.'

III.

RATIONALE OF THE COURT

The court in Powell found that "OCGA § 16-6-2, insofar as it criminalizes the performance of private, unforced, non-commercial acts of sexual
intimacy between persons legally able to consent, 'manifestly infringes
upon a constitutional provision' which guarantees to the citizens of
Georgia the right of privacy."6 9 The court extensively quoted and relied
on Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co.7 ° to establish that
Georgia was a "pioneer" in recognizing the right of privacy and that
citizens have "the right to be let alone so long as [one] was not interfering with rights of other individuals or of the public."71
The court addressed the question of the constitutionality of the sodomy
statute in two parts. The first issue was "whether the constitutional
right of privacy screens from governmental interference a non-commercial sexual act that occurs without force in a private home between
persons legally capable of consenting to the act."72 The second issue

66. Id. at 484-85, 468 S.E.2d at 195-96.
67. Id. at 489, 468 S.E.2d at 199 (Hunstein, J., dissenting).
68. 270 Ga. at 333 & n.5, 510 S.E.2d at 24 & n.5. In Phaganv. State, 268 Ga. 272, 486
S.E.2d 876 (1997), the supreme court addressed which level of scrutiny should be used in
determining whether a statute implicates privacy concerns. The court agreed that
although Christensen used the rational basis test, when an individual invokes the
fundamental right to privacy, strict scrutiny should be used in evaluating the statute that
implicates the right. Id. at 274, 486 S.E.2d at 879. The court found that low scrutiny may
be used when legislation "'does not discriminate on racial grounds or against a suspect
class.'" Id. at 274-75, 486 S.E.2d at 879-80 (quoting Fleming v. Zant, 259 Ga. 687, 688, 386
S.E.2d 339, 340 (1989)).
69. 270 Ga. at 336, 510 S.E.2d at 26 (quoting Miller v. State, 266 Ga. 850, 852, 472
S.E.2d 74, 77 (1996)).
70. 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
71. 270 Ga. at 329-30, 510 S.E.2d at 21-22 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(alteration by court).
72. Id. at 332, 510 S.E.2d at 23-24.
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was "whether the government's infringement upon that right is
constitutionally sanctioned."73
In addressing the first issue, the court answered in the affirmative.74
The court held that "such activity is at the heart of the Georgia
Constitution's protection of the right of privacy."75 The court stated
that Pavesich did not expressly hold that sexual activity is within the
realm of the right of privacy, but that it is clear that such activity is
within that realm: "We cannot think of any other activity that reasonable persons would rank as more private and more deserving of
protection from governmental interference than unforced, private, adult
sexual activity."76

Having decided that Powell's activity was within the realm of the right
of privacy, the court then addressed the question of "whether the
government's infringement upon that right is constitutionally sanctioned."77 In contrast to Christensen, the court stated that the government must have a compelling interest to infringe on the fundamental
right of privacy and that any intrusion into that right must be made by
the least78 intrusive means possible to meet the state's compelling
interest.
The court noted that the state had compelling interests in "shielding
the public from inadvertent exposure to the intimacies of others, in
protecting minors and other legally incapable of consent from sexual
abuse, and in preventing people from being forced to submit to sex acts
against their will."79 These compelling interests are served, according
to the court, by narrowly tailored statutes designed to prohibit conduct
that is inimical to the state's interests and by vigorously prosecuting
violators of these statutes.80 The court reasoned, "In light of the

73. Id. at 332-33, 510 S.E.2d at 24.
74. Id. at 332, 510 S.E.2d at 24.
75. Id.

76. Id.
77. Id. at 332-33, 510 S.E.2d at 24.
78. Id. at 333, 510 S.E.2d at 24.
79.

Id.

80. Id. The court listed the following statutes meant to serve the state's compelling
interests in "preventing sexual assaults and shielding and protecting the public from sexual
acts by the enactment of criminal statutes such conduct: OCGA § 16-6-1 (rape); § 16-6-2(a)
(aggravated sodomy); § 16-6-3 (statutory rape); § 16-6-4 (child molestation and aggravated
child molestation); § 16-6-5 (enticing a child for indecent purposes); § 16-6-5.1 (sexual
assault of prisoners, the institutionalized, and the patients of psychotherapists); § 16-6-6
(bestiality); § 16-6-7 (sexual assault of a dead human being); § 16-6-8 (public indecency);
§§ 16-6-9 to -12 (prostitution, pimping, pandering); § 16-6-15 (solicitation of sodomy); § 166-16 (masturbation for hire); § 16-6-22 (incest); §§ 16-6-22.1 and 16-6-22.2 (sexual battery
and aggravated sexual battery)." 270 Ga. at 333, 510 S.E.2d at 24.
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existence of these statutes, the sodomy statute's raison d'etre can only
be to regulate the private sexual conduct of consenting adults."8 l As
such, it was beyond the scope of any compelling state interest and, thus,
beyond the limits of permissible state regulation. 2
The court also addressed the holding in Christensen that sodomy
regulation is within the police power of the state to regulate public
welfare and morals." The court did not expressly overrule Christensen,
but it admitted that the regulation of private, consensual, adult activity
was beyond the police power of the state because the statute does not
benefit the public, but it unduly burdens individuals. 4
Justice Sears delivered a concurring opinion in which she found that
the court correctly applied the strict scrutiny standard to the sodomy
statute. 5 The remainder of her opinion lambasted the dissenting
opinion of Justice Carley.
Justice Carley delivered the sole dissent to the opinion of the court.
He believed that the court overstepped the boundaries of its authority:
"[T]he Court has usurped the legislative authority of the General
Assembly to establish the public policy of this state."" Justice Carley
found that the revocation of the sodomy statute, as applied to private,
consensual sexual activity, is a decision that should be made by the
people of Georgia via the legislature. 7 He stated that it is not the
proper role of the court to change the law of the state whenever "a
majority of this Court happens to conclude" that its opinion is the "more
enlightened viewpoint on a particular controversial issue." 8 To allow
the court to change what it feels is not an "enlightened" law, regardless
of the will of the legislature, "constitutes government by this Court,
rather than government through a constitutional system."89 Justice
Carley did not express an opinion on whether the sodomy statute
"should or should not" be repealed, but he stated that "this Court should
not, and indeed constitutionally cannot, do it."' Justice Carley, relying
on Christensen, also stated that the sodomy statute is within the police
power of the state to enact.9 ' He found that by invalidating the

81.

270 Ga. at 334, 510 S.E.2d at 24-25.

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id., 510 S.E.2d at 25.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 336, 510 S.E.2d at 26 (Sears, J., concurring).
Id. at 344, 510 S.E.2d at 31 (Carley, J., dissenting).
Id. at 345-46, 510 S.E.2d at 32.
Id. at 344-45, 510 S.E.2d at 32.
Id. at 345, 510 S.E.2d at 32.
Id.
Id. at 338, 510 S.E.2d at 28.
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criminal statute, the court "violates the fundamental constitutional
principle of separation of powers."92 He claimed that by recognizing
this right to privacy, the court was allowing the criminal law to be
violated. 93 "In my opinion, freedom to violate the criminal law is
simply anarchy and, thus, the antithesis of an ordered constitutional
system."9 4
Notwithstanding Justice Carley's arguments, the majority found that
noncommercial, private, consensual sexual acts between two adults is
within the realm of the right of privacy and that the state has no
compelling interest in regulating such activity."5 The court declared
that Georgia's sodomy statute was unconstitutional to the extent that it
proscribed such activity.9
Therefore, the court reversed Powell's
conviction for performing an act of consensual cunnilingus.9 7
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

The implications of Powell are probably more illusory than tangible.
In Georgia case law, especially since Bowers v. Hardwick," there is
little, if any, evidence of persons being arrested for noncommercial,
private, consensual sexual acts.
In two cases in which the holding in Powell has been tested, the court
of appeals found Powell to be inapplicable because the criminal activity
went beyond simple sodomy. In Johnson v. State,9 9 a jury convicted
defendant of aggravated sodomy and aggravated child molestation."°
Defendant argued that Powell abrogated the crime of sodomy. The court
stated that Powell only held the statute unconstitutional to the extent
that it criminalized noncommercial, private, consensual sexual acts
between adults.1"' In McBee v. State,"2 the jury convicted defendant
of rape, aggravated sodomy, and sodomy. After consolidating the sodomy
count with the aggravated sodomy count, the trial court entered
judgment against defendant for rape and aggravated sodomy. Defendant
argued that Powell voided his convictions for sodomy and aggravated

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id. at 339-40, 510 S.E.2d at 28-29.
Id. at 340, 510 S.E.2d at 29.
270 Ga. at 334, 510 S.E.2d at 25.
Id. at 336, 510 S.E.2d at 26.
Id.
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
236 Ga. App. 764, 513 S.E.2d 291 (1999).
Id. at 764, 513 S.E.2d at 292.
Id. at 766, 513 S.E.2d at 294.
239 Ga. App. 314, 521 S.E.2d 209 (1999).
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sodomy."° The court again stated that Powell only held the sodomy
statute unconstitutional to the extent that it criminalized noncommercial, private, consensual sexual acts between adults. 4 The court also
stated that Powell did not address aggravated sodomy. °5 Because
defendant was not sentenced on the sodomy conviction, the court found
his argument to be a nullity."°
In three other recent cases, the court of appeals upheld sodomy
convictions because the acts occurred in public places. In Parks v.
State, °7 defendant was convicted of sodomy. Defendant appealed his
conviction based on Powell.'° However, the court affirmed his conviction because he performed the acts in a public place." ° In Gagnon v.
State,"' defendant was convicted of sodomy and appealed his conviction based on Powell."' The court affirmed the conviction because the
sodomy occurred in a lingerie modeling shop." 2 The court stated, "The
conviction of [defendant] of sodomy for a sex act in a public, commercial
place is not prohibited by Powell.""' In Mauk v. State,"' defendant
appealed his conviction for sodomy based on Powell."5 Again, the
court affirmed the conviction because the acts occurred in a public place
(in this case, adjacent to a road)." 6
In one case, Brewer v. State,"7 the supreme court reversed a sodomy
conviction based on Powell. In Brewer defendant was charged with
aggravated sodomy and aggravated child molestation for an alleged
single act of sodomy with his eleven-year-old stepdaughter."' Defendant was convicted of both counts. The trial court merged the aggravated child molestation conviction into the aggravated sodomy conviction
and sentenced defendant only on aggravated sodomy." 9 The supreme
court reiterated that since Powell, "consensual sodomy is no longer a

103. Id. at 314, 521 S.E.2d at 209.
104. Id. at 315, 521 S.E.2d at 210.

105. Id.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
241 Ga. App. 381, - S.E.2d _(1999).
Id. at 381-82, - S.E.2d at
.
Id. at 383, - S.E.2d at _.
240 Ga. App. 754, 525 S.E.2d 127 (1999).
Id. at 754-55, 756, 525 S.E.2d at 128, 129.
Id. at 756, 525 S.E.2d at 129.
Id.
2000 WL 122162 (Ga. App. Feb. 2, 2000).
Id. at *1.
Id.
271 Ga. 605, 523 S.E.2d 18 (1999).
Id. at 607-08, 523 S.E.2d at 20.
Id. at 605-06, 523 S.E.2d at 19.
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crime" in Georgia.120 The court reversed defendant's conviction for
aggravated sodomy because there was no proof that defendant acted
with force in committing the sodomy, leaving only a charge of sodomy
(which was committed in a private, noncommercial, consensual
The court remanded the case to the trial court with
manner).'
instructions to charge and sentence defendant with aggravated child
molestation, a crime that needs no proof of force.' 22
There are no published cases that test Powell and that do not involve
other crimes. In fact, except the arrest in Hardwick, there have been
very few cases involving a person arrested solely for sodomy in many
years. The police and courts simply have not enforced the statute
against persons engaged in noncommercial, private, consensual sexual
acts. Therefore, the tangible effects of Powell will probably be minimal.
However, in the recent cases that have tested Powell, the courts have
strictly construed that decision.
The illusory effects, however, are potentially great. The sodomy
statute has long been seen by many as specifically curtailing homosexual
acts (though the statute does not state that as an objective). After
Powell the argument that the state was simply trying to criminalize
homosexuality vanishes. The court implicitly gave homosexual sex the
protection of the state constitution. However, the court also protected
heterosexual sodomy in Powell.
Moreover, Powell guarantees Georgians the right to be secure in their
noncommercial, private, consensual sexual acts. Though it is very
improbable that the statute ever really deterred noncommercial, private,
consensual sexual acts of sodomy, Powell tells the state that, in almost
all circumstances, it does not have a compelling interest to enter a
person's bedroom.
GREGORY K. SMITH

120. Id. at 607, 523 S.E.2d at 20.
121. Id. at 608, 523 S.E.2d at 20.
122. Id.

